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BRIF-F OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
11733 
S'l'ATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Appellant appeals from his conviction in the Third 
Judicial District Court, Honorable .Merrill C. Faux, 
Judge, presiding, of the crime of Murder in the Second 
Degree. 
DISPOSI'rION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was originally charged ·with Murder rn 
the First Dt>gree, in violation of 76-30-1, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953. Prior to the trial, appellant discovered 
(R. 19) that the in·osecntion intended to rely upon cer-
tain statenwnts and admissions which were made by 
a1>11ellant during his interrogation. Appellant moved to 
suppress the (•\-idence (R. 2G) on the ground that there 
2 
had been no valid waiver of appellant's constitutional 
right to remain silent and to have the assistance of 
counsel. After a hearing, Judge Faux denied the motion 
to suppress. 
On March 25, 1969, the trial was held before Judge 
Faux. Appellant pleaded not guilty to a reduced charge 
of :Murder in the Second Degree. Upon a hearing of 
the evidence, as stipulated by the prosecution and de-
fense, Judge Faux found Gerald Scandrett guilty of 
Murder in the Second Degree. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks a reversal of appellant's con-
viction in the Third ·Judicial District Court . 
• IH' .... • -
,r .,., 
STATEMEN11 OF FACTS 
On November 8, 1968, the appellant, Gerald Scan-
drett, \vas in the ninth day of continuous drinking of 
intoxicating liquors. During this period he had con-
sumed an inordinate amonnt of liquor and on November 
Sth he had been drinking a high-alcohol content Tokay 
\Vine. His entire food intake during November 8 was a 
half of a bacon sandwich consumed at approximately 
10:15 A.M. (R. 52-53). 
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At approximately 5 :00 P.M. on November 8th, a 
stabbing occurred in appellant's hotel room. Present in 
the room were the appellant, the appellant's drinking 
eompanion, Quimby Ferguson, ·who ·was also in a highly 
intoxicated condition, and Tony Trujillo, the victim of 
the stabbing. About five minutes after the stabbing 
appellant notified the desk clerk that the police should 
lJe called. Dnring the fin minutes which elapsed be-
tween the stabbing and tht> notification of the desk 
(']erk, the appellanteonsumt>dmorewine (R. 55). 
A few minutes after 5 :00 P . .ThL the police arrived 
and appellant was placed under arrest (R. 107). He was 
taken to police headquarters and at 5 :50 P.M. a tape 
recording was made of his intc->rrogation (R. 109). The 
first part of the interrogation was an involved attempt 
to explain the elements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
43G (1966), to the appellant (R. 93-94). 
Thereafter, appellant supposedly waived his consti-
tutional rights to remain silent and to assistance of 
counsel (R. 94). Thereafter, appellant made self-incrim-
ina ting statemt>nts and admissions. 
The interrogation ·was conclnded one hour and 30 
minutes after appellant's last drink. At that time a blood 
alcohol test ·was administered. Tlw City Chemist re-
ported that at 6 :30 P.M. appellant's blood alcohol level 




APPELLANT'S ADVANCED ST ATE OF INTOXI-
CATION RESULTED IN AN IMPAIRMENT OF HIS 
MENTAL FACULTIES WHICH RENDERED HIM 
IN CAP ABLE OF A "KNOWING AND INTELLI-
GENT" WAIVER OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
TO ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
In Miranda v. Ari.zona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the 
Supreme Court of the United States laid down specific 
rules regarding the admissibility of statemPnts obtained 
from an individual who is subjected to custodial police 
interrogation. As t\. constitutional prerequisite to the 
admissibility of snch statements, the suspect must be 
warned, prior to questioning, that he has a right to 
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be 
used against him, and that he has a right to the im-
mediate presence of counsel and if he cannot afford 
counsel, counsel will be provided for him without expense. 
If the defendant chooses to make a statement without 
exercising his constitutional rights it must be shown that 
he made a clear intelligent waiver of those guaranteed 
rights. 
A heavy burden rests upon the state to show that a 
valid constitutional waiver was made. 
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"If the interrogation continues without the 
presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, 
a heavy bitrden rests on the govet'nment to demon-
strate that the defendant knowingly and intelli-
gently waived his privilege against self-incrimi-
nation and his right to retained or appointed 
counsel." 384 U.S. at 475. (Emphasis added.) 
Appellant contends that his highly intoxicated con-
dition at the time of questioning made it impossible for 
him to make a "knowing and intelligent" waiver of his 
constitutional rights. 
In Logner v. State of North Carolirw, 260 F. Supp. 
970 (M.D. N.C. 196G), it was established that when a 
defendant is intoxicated to a degree which in1pairs his 
judgment, an attempt to waive his constitutional rights 
is ineffectual. In Log•ner, the defendant had been drink-
ing heavily and had been taking amphetamines. The 
police noted that "he wasn't walking like a sober man," 
but they did not believe that he was drunk enough to 
be arrested for public drunkenness. Upon closer obser-
vation the police discovered that the defendant was 
"obviously drunk." The alleged waiver of his constitu-
tional rights was embodied in the remark "I can tell 
you anything I want to. You still have to prove it." In 
ruling that there was no valid waiver, the court said: 
"The accused may always waive his rights, 
but this waiver must be made voluntarily, know-
ingly, and intelligently. 
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However, no snch waiyer can be said to have 
taken place in this case. The petitioner in his 
condition was incapable of acting knowingly or 
intelLlgently. Once in custody and when the in-
vestigation had focused on the petitioner as the 
accused, at that moment a cloak of constitn-
tional rights enveloped the petitioner. This cloak 
conld only be removed by some affirmative 
action on the part of the petitioner and at the 
time the petitioner ·was incapable of any affirma-
tive action. E1Jen though the vctitio11rr in his 
-intoxicated state might attempt to 1raive his co11-
stitntiona.l right to remain silent or to hare 
counsel, the u;aiver ico11ld have to l;e i11Pffect11nl 
brcause the petitionn's ,judgment iras impaired. 
To waive his constitutional rights, the petitioner 
must be capable of doing so in a voluntary, know-
ing, aYid intelligc>nt manner. The petitioner was 
not in that position." 2o0 F. fiupp. at 977. 
The critical issue before this Conrt is whether the 
appellant, Gerald Scandrett, was in such a state of 
intoxication that his judgment was impaired. If it can 
be sho,\'11 that there was an appreciable impairment of 
appellant's mental faculties at the time of the alleged 
wain'r of his constitutional rights, this court must hold 
that the confession was inadmissible, and reverse the 
judgment of the lower conrt. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 
U.S. 506 (1962); Glasser 'I.'. States, 315 U.S. 60 
(1942). 
The rerord sho-\VS that at (j :30 P.1\1. on l\ovember 8, 
one hour and thirty minutes after appellant's last drink, a 
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blood-alcohol test was administered and appellant showed 
a lewl of .2GO (R. 69-70). A conservatin estimate of 
tlw blood-alcohol level at time of the arrest and 
intenogation ,,·as placed at .282 (R. 71). The only 
l'Yidl•nce before the lower court on this issue was the 
testimony of D1·. Stt>wart Haryey, a pharmacologist ·who 
had done extensi,·e n•s<>arch in the arPa of blood-alcohol 
lr\·els and tlw effect of alcohol upon body metabolism 
and nwntal faculties. Dr. Harwy testified as follows 
n•s1H·etinµ: tlw ability of the ap1wllant to rnake judgments: 
"My opinion is, this individual would be im-
paired in his ahilit>· to iwrceiye the consequences 
of any responses that are elicite>d hy questioning 
of the officPr ... and the fact that an alcoholic 
or iwrnon undt>r the inflneneP of alcohol ... will 
rlo things nmlPr tJw inflnenrP of alcohol that 
are detrimental to himself and to his ·well-being, 
indieates that a person undPr the influence, is 
of aeting, intelligentl>·, in his self-
interest, whether it is behind the ·wheel or in 
responsp to questioning· - and situations of this 
sort. 
Q. And would it hr- your judgment, then, that, 
at the level of (point).26 - that is you are 
basing this answer upon the point .26 level; 
is that COITPet7 
A. T am basing it on any lPYel ahon• (point) .1. 
Kow, the exaet ext<>nt of the impairment at 
(point) .2(i, I am unable to say, Pxeept it 
would lw C'Onsideralily higher than level of 
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(point) .1, above which all experts in this 
field are agreed, there is some impairment." 
(R. Rl-R2). 
The prosecution did not call exrwrt witnesses 
to contradict Dr. Harvey's testimony. His tPstimony 
was ce1iainly sufficient to establish that appellant's 
judgnwnt \ms considL•rably impaired at the time of his 
alleged wain•r, and a "knowing and intelligent" waiver 
in the true spirit of Miranda was 
Ample snp1Jort for the validity of Dr. testi-
mony can he' found in cmTent rnedical l'Psearch and wTit-
ings. Ho\YeYer, the most rwrtinent statellwnt is fonnd 
in (ed.) : Alcolwl Rducatio11 for Classroom and 
Comm unity, Hill, Kvw York, 19G4. In an article 
entitled "The RPSIJOnsc• of tlw Body to Diff<>rent Con-
centrations of Alcohol: Chemical Tests for lntoxication,'' 
the effect of alcohol on brain functions is discussed. The 
condusion in this area was that deterioration of judg-
ment and self-control was first symptom of intoxi-
cation. 
"These [.judgment and self-control] represent 
the highest functions of the brain, and impairment 
begins 1'ith concentrations of alcohol below those 
which \\ill cause iimseular incoordination." Id. 
at 
It is ::-:ignificant that .Judg<' F"aux arrived at his deci-
sion to drny the appellant's motion to suppress because of 
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the absence of halting s1wech or slurring by the appellant 
as evidencPd b)' the tape recording (R. 99). This alone 
is hardly conclusive evidence, especially when weighed 
against the previous testimony of Dr. Harvey (R. 88-89). 
Snpport for this argument is in Forrester: Chemical 
Tests for Alcohol in Traffic Law Enforcement, Charles 
C. Thomas, Springfield, Illinois, 1950. Although the 
writer ·was focusing on the issue of blood alcohol level 
and its relation to driving ahilit)', the following state-
ments ar<' highly rC'levant to tlw case at hand: 
'·The qlwstion fr<•quc>ntly arises whether there 
arc some drivers so little affectc:>d by alcohol that 
it reqnirPs more than .15% of blood alcohol to 
lower their driving ability. Many tests han' failed 
to find such a person. A few do not ::,;tagger or 
e.r!zilJit thick speech wdil the blood alcohol reaches 
perhaps .25</'c but all the heavy drinkers tested 
have shown definite .loivering in drii 0ing and other 
skills when the blood alcohol reached .15o/o. In 
fact all ·were somewhat adnrsely affected when 
he blood alcohol was above .10%. Judgment is 
the first body faculty to be affected by alcohol. 
Id. at 28-29. (Emphasis added.) 
Appellant submits that the motion to suppress evi-
dence should have been granted J ndge Faux. The 
State had a "heavy burden" of proof to show that the 
·waiv<•r was made '·intelligently and knowingly," and it 
has failed to sustain that bnrden. In Jliranda, the court 
was t•mphatic in placing lrnrden of proof upon the 
state: 
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" ... a heavy burden rests on the government 
to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and 
intelligently waived his privilege against self-
incrimination and his right to retained or ap-
pointed counsel. This court has always set high 
standards of proof for the waiver of constitutional 
rights, and we reassert these standards as applied 
to in custody interrogation." 384 U.S. at 475. 
Dr. Stewart Harvey presented expert testimony in 
support of appellant's contention that an "intelligent 
and knowing" -.,rniver was impossible in his intoxicated 
condition. The state did not elect to rebut Dr. Harvey's 
testimony with contrary expert testimony. The state 
relied only upon cross-examination by the District At-
torney in an effort to discredit Dr. Harvey's testimony. 
Tlwrefore, the state has not sho-.,vn that thc•re was a 
valid waiver of appellant's constitutional rights, and thus 
the denial of appellant's motion to suppress was a re-
versible error. 
In cases decided decades berore Miranda the Su-
preme Court defined the qualitative standard a trial 
court judge should follow in a situation where a defend-
ant wished to waive his constitutional right to counsel 
at trial. Possibly the most definitive description of the 
quality of waiver necessary to relinquish tlLis constitu-
tional right is found in Von M oltkP v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 
708 (1948) where Justice Black described the extent of 
a judge's duty: 
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''To discharge this duty properly in light of 
the strong presumption against waiver of the con-
stitutional right to counsel, a judge must investi-
gate as long and as thoroughly as the circum-
stances of the case before him demand. The fact 
that an accused mav tell him that he is informed 
of his right to and desires to waive this 
right does not automatically end the judge's 
responsibility. To be valid such waiver must be 
made ,,·ith an apprehension of the nature of the 
charges, the statutory offenses included ·within 
them, the range of allowable punishments there-
under, possible ddenses to the charges and cir-
cumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other 
facts essential to a broad understanding of the 
whole matt<•r." 332 F.S. at 723-24. 
It is not appl'llant's contt>ntion that th<.• duty pbc<.'d on 
judges hy ron Jfolfke lllUSt llPCessarily he PXknded in 
entirety to interrogating police officers by Mir([Jnda, but 
it is contended that whether at trial or during question-
ing it is equally important that the standards for waiver 
should be at very least similar since the same reasons 
for caution are present. Appellant considers it signifi-
cant that the Supn'me Court, in defining the quality of 
waiver necessary under Miranda, cites and quotes from 
an earlier case, Carnley v. Cochran, 3G9 U.S. 506 (1962): 
''The record must show, or there must be an 
allE'gation and evidence which show, that an ac-
cused was offered counsel hut intelligently and 
understandingly rPjected the off er. Anything less 
is not waiwr." U.S. at 51fi. 
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The problem of the "voluntary, knowing and intelli-
gent" waiver has not escaped the attrntion of legal 
scholars and writers. Indeed many han' proposed stand-
ards far more broad than the narrow ruling ar)pellant 
requests this court to make. Richard Kuh in ''Some 
Views on Miranda v. Arizona," 35 Fordham L. Rev. 233 
(] 9GG) contends: 
''Putting these rt'latively rare situations ont 
of thP way and turning to the far more common 
situation of someone taken into custody involun-
taril)·, and not :,.;hre·wdly advised by his lawyer, l 
would like to explore my reasons for stating there 
is rarely snch a thing as an intelligent, voluntary 
wain•r." at 23:L 
"If ... the defrndant does \\·aiw and say 
that he \Yants to talk, then he talks for either of 
two reason:,.;: ( 1) he did not understand the whole 
"formula," and, if he did not understand it, there 
is a "waiver" that was made without an under-
standing of the warning; such an alleged \vaiver 
is a nullity; or (2) although he understood the 
warning, he still wcwtl'd to waive .... [A] syl-
logism demonstrates the inYalidity of this waiver. 
The major premise is: To hurt oneself inten-
tionally is not intPlligent, but is StU}Jid. rrhe minor 
premise is: a defendant, 1\'110 with knmYledge that 
lte can only hurt himself by talking, talks, inh•n-
tionally hurts himself. The conclnsion is: His 
act in talking intentionally is a stupid, non-intelli-
gt>nt act." at 234-;J. 
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rrhe reportt'rs of the ABA Project on Minimum Stand-
ards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Provid-
ing Defense Services 7.3 (Tent. Draft 19G7) reached 
the following conclusion: 
''If a person ·who has not a la'""'Ye'r indi-
cates his intention to waive the assistance of coun-
sel, a la'""'Yer should he provided to consult with 
him. No waiver shonld he accepted unless he has 
at 1Past oncP conf Prred with a lawyer." 
Ohvionsly, thl• trn(• nwaning of "knowingly and in-
tdligent1y'' mnst li<> somewhere hetween the idealistic 
realm of the lPgal theorists and the ritualistic lip service 
giYen hy many courts. Many courts appear to ignore 
rathPr than interpret "knowing]_\' and intPllig0ntly." The 
Conrt of Criminal Appeals of Texas in Graywn v. State, 
438 S.vV. 2d 553 (Tex. App. 19G9) affirmed a conviction 
of murder. The defendant, a fifty year old man, was 
deemed to have waived his right to remain silent and 
to the assistance of counsel even though a psychologist 
and a psychiatrist testified that the defendant had an 
f.Q. of ;)1 and classifiPd him as a low grade moron. The 
psychiatrist testified that it was his opinion that the 
defendant was not as intelligent as a normal three or 
four year old child and that "on rare occasions [he 
had] seen people as senrel,\· retarded as this man walk-
ing on tlH• streets.'' SnrPly if this "·a:; the type of quali-
tatiYe standard intended the Su1ff(•me Court in Mi-
rnnda, th('Y would not have used the phrase "knowingly 
14 
and intelligently." Appellant does not contend that every 
police station mnst have a la\\·yer or that onl.'· pt'I'sons 
of ad,·anced lt•gal Pdncation may wain:• their constitu-
tional rights. Appellant does contend that the term 
''knowingly and iut('lligPntly" means, if it is to mz'an 
anything at all, that constitutional rights, one of the 
most preeious gifts of our society, cannot be waived by 
drunks, morons, and infants. 
An t:•xamplt• of a proJH'r imple11w11tation of the 
.lli rr111da rule was shown in a recent decision by Judge J. 
Fauntleroy of the J uwnile Court of the District of Co-
lumbia. In the of a Youth Charged icith Honiicide, 
\rash. D.C . . J.C. Ko. G9--±4<i0-.J (No,-. 18, l9GD) involv0d 
a lG year-old yontli \\·ho had supposedly waived his right 
to counsel and made a Yoluntary confession of first-
degree murder. Judge Fauntleroy suppressed the evi-
dence of the confession and held that a juvenne is unable 
to wai w• his right to counsel. The rationale of the dE•ci-
sion was that a youth does not have the maturity to waive 
:rnch an important right. Such a holding is a true inter-
pretation of thP principle of the Miranda decision. A 16 
year old yonth is not capal1le of a "lrnowing and intelli-
gent" wainr of his constitutional rights, for his jnd.L,rnwnt 
is impairt•d h:-· immaturit.'·; and a drnnken adult is not 
eapahle of a "knowing and intelligent wain•r, for his judg-




APPELLANT DID NOT "KNOWINGLY AND IN-
TELLIGENTLY" WAIVE HIS CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT TO APPOINTED COUNSEL DURING QUES-
TIONING, BECAUSE APPELLANT DID ATTEMPT, 
IN A CONFUSED AND GROPING MANNER, TO 
EXERCISE THAT RIGHT AND THE ATTEMPT 
WAS IGNORED BY INTERROGATING OFFICERS. 
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Con-
stitution of the United States, as interpreted by the 
Supreme Court in Miranda 'l'. Ari.zoua, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966), guarantees an accused the right to appointed 
counsel during custodial interrogation. Appellant at-
tempted to exercise this constitutional right. His admit-
tedly confused and imprecise request was ignored by 
the interrogating officers. Appellant was scared. A vio-
lent crime, policemen, excited onlookers, arrest, the police 
station, questions-any man, guilty or innocent, would be 
confused and frightened in that situa6on. 
The tape recording of appellant's interrogation as 
reported in the trial transcript reveals the following ex-
change on lines 29 of page 93 through 14 of page 94: 
"29. Officer: ''Right; you have a right to talk to 
an attorney and have a 
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30. right to have him present during question-
ing." 
1. Appellant: "I don't have an attorney, but I'll 
have to get one, looks 
2. like, don't it?" 
3. Officer: "Well if you can't afford an attor-
ney, one will be obtained 
±. for you at no expense to you." 
5. Appellant: "Well, I'll get one from the Ma-
rine Corps, or try to get one 
6. from the Marine Corps that will defend me. 
I don't know which one 
7. I ought to get, yet." 
8. Officer: "Well, if you can't afford one, the 
State will retain one." 
9. Appellant: "One of these will have to; I won't 
want the Marine Corps 
10. 'cause I didn't mean to kill the man and if he 
dies, I'm gonna be 
11. the son-of-a-bitch that's gonna take it; now, 
I'm gonna be 
17 
12. the son-of-a-bikh that suffers, and I'll admit 
j t." 
13. Officer: "Now, do you understand all these 
rights?" 
14. Appellant: "Yes, sir; I understand." 
In lines 1 and 2 appellant 'Said " ... I'll have to get 
one, looks like don't it?" This statement is evidence of 
a confused impaired mind trying to grasp a totally over-
whelming situation. It is an aborted attempt at exercis-
ing a right and gives further testimony of lack of under-
standing in that it refers to the future, possibly at trial, 
not the present. In line five the appellant says " ... I'll 
get one from the Marine Corps, ... " ·what prompted 
appellant to ref er to a Marine Corps lawyer when he 
was a Navy Possibly the Marine Corps was a 
part of some drunken fantasy or brag, but certainly it 
was not part of a "knowing and intelligent" attempt to 
protect appellant's interests. In lines 6 and 7 appellant 
says "I don't know which one I ought to get, yet." Here 
the appellant clearly shows that he wants a lawyer. 
Granted appellant did not specifically and unequivocally 
demand an attorney, but the meaning was there for the 
interrogating officers had they wanted to follow the 
spirit and meaning of Miranda rather than trying to 
thread their way between the literal minimum boundaries 
of that opinion. The request was made but the interro-
gating officers ignored it because they knew they could 
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change and dfrect ap1wllant's train of thought away from 
this riglit, and could with patience• obtain an affirrna-
tin• answer to the quPstion finally posed in line 13. 
Clearly, in the dialogue c•xarnined, ap1wllant at-
tPmpted to exPrcise his right to counsPl: a right appel-
lant didn't understand, Iiad Iwn•r had explained to him 
in a non-fiction situation, and whirh 1rns heing couched 
in language which could only further confuse him. Only 
onre was appellant told Jw had a rig-ht to counsel during 
questioning and there was no mention of the fact that 
appointed, frflp counsel 1rns ayailahlP to him at that 
timP. Appointed coum;e], as opposed to retained coun-
sPl, is mentioned in lines 4 and 5, where the officer stated 
•'\Vdl, if you can't afford an attorney, one irill be ob-
tained for you ... " By this statement the officer implies 
that free counsel is not no"· available but ·will be pro-
vided later. "vVilI" is not a vrnrd of the present, it refers 
to the future: tomorrow, next week, at trial, even after 
yon have talkd to us, but not right now. 
ThP manm"'r in which aprwllant's rights \\·ere ex-
plained to him and the manner in which his attempted 
request for immediate rounsd werP passed over, led ap-
pdllant to tJw conclusion that he had a right to retain 
counsel during, which lw conkl not afford, and appointed 
eounsel for for thP purposP of trial. 
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An accused is not required to state and demand his 
rights in precise constitntional terminology. He need 
only <'Xpress his desire for counsel. It is clc>arly stated 
in M ira·nda: 
"The defendant mav waive effectuation of 
these rights, provided tl{e waiver is made volun-
tarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, 
he indicates in any manner and at any stage of 
the process that he wishes to consult with an 
attorney before speaking there can be no ques-
tioning." 384 U.S. at 444-45 (emphasis added). 
This portion of the Miranda opinion was the basis for 
the holding made in State v. Word, 456 P.2d 210 (N.M. 
App. 1969). There the conrt of appeals reversed a 
;.;econd degree murder conviction on the grounds that 
appellant's conviction was based, in whole or in part, 
on a confession obtained after the defendant had been 
deprived of his constitutional right to assistance of coun-
sel. The defendant never made the direct statement "I 
>rnnt a lawyer." Defendant did give indications of want-
ing a lawyer, but each time the prosecutor "by indirec-
tion" circmnvented the issue. The court cited the lan-
guage in Miranda "If he indicates in any manner and 
at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult 
with an attorney before speaking there can be no ques-
tioning," and then stated that "tlw law officers cannot 
ayoid this directi\'e nor should they attempt by direction 
or indirection, to dissnade a defendant from consulting 
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an attorney." 45G P.2d at 212. In the case at hand the 
interrogating officers turned by dir<>ction, appellant's 
already confused, and drunken train of thought away 
from the task of undPrstanding and utilizing his right 
to counsel. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT'S ADVANCED STATE OF INTOXI-
CATION RENDERED HIS CONFESSION "INVOL-
UNTARY," AND BECAUSE THE CONFESSION WAS 
ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE, THE APPELLANT'S 
CONVICTION l\fUST BE REVERSED. 
The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the 
United States provides that no person "shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self." This constitutional mandate has been formulated 
into the rule that convictions following the admission 
into evidence of confessions which are involuntary, i.t>., 
the product of coercion, either physical or psychological, 
cannot stand. If such a confession ·which offends due 
process fonns any part of the basis for a criminal con-
viction, then the conviction cannot stand "even though 
there is ample evidence asid(, from the confession to 
support the conviction." Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 
(1964). The rule was ap1)Iied to the states in Malloy v. 
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (19G-1), the court stated: 
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"The Fonrt<"enth Amendment secures against 
state invasion the same privilege that the Fifth 
Amendment guarantees against frderal infringl'-
ment - the right of a person to rPrnain silent 
unless he chooses to speak in the nnfetter<:.d exer-
cise of his own "'ill. .. " 378 F.S. at 8. 
rrhe standard of voluntariness has developed into a 
policy of restdcting the admissibility of any confession 
obtained by questionable practices or under questionable> 
C'ircumstances. As Chief Justice arren said in Town-
send v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (19G3), "If an individual's will 
was ov0rborne or if his confession was not the product 
of a rational intellect and a 'free will' his confession 
is inadmissible because coerced." Id. at 307. 
A confession made by one in the appellant's ad-
,·anced state of intoxication could not be the product 
of a rational intellect and a free will. It has been shown 
that any person with a .260 blood alcohol level would 
suffer an appreciable impairment of his mental facul-
ties, especially his judgment and reason. A person who 
had lost control of his mental faculties is incapable of 
making an admissible confession. 
In Logner v. State of North Carolina, 260 F. Supp. 
970 (N.C.M.D. 1966), the defendant was a chronic alco-
holic who had been drinking heavily and had been taking 
amphetamines. The court ruled that his confession wa:s 
involuntary because his mental faculties were appreci-
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ably impaired by his advanced state of intoxication; "any 
decision to incriminate made in the intoxicated state of 
petitioner could not be free and unconstrained." The 
court reasoned that if the defendant was charged with be-
ing under the influence, this would be adequate evidence 
that his mental faculties were impaired; and impaired to 
an extent which would render any confession "involun-
tary." In holding the confession "involuntary," the court 
stated: 
"Was this confession the product of an essen-
tially free and unconstrained choice of its maker? 
This Court must answer in the negative .... The 
petitioner's will had been overborne by the alco-
hol and drugs. 'Whether he had a false sense of 
confidence ... or an acute sense of remorse, his 
capacity for self-determination was critically im-
paired, rendering any confession gained objec-
tionable." 260 F. Supp. at 976. 
There can be no doubt that appellant Gerald Scand-
rett's capacity for self-determination wa;s critically im-
paired. The Federal District Court in the Logner case 
accepted a charge of driving under the influence as suf-
ficient evidence of a critical impairment. It is signifi-
cant that in Utah a blood alcohol level of .08 is consid-
ered presumptive evidence that the person is under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor. Section 41-6-44, Utah 
Code Annotated (1969 Supp.). Appellant's blood alcohol 
level of .26 was conclusive evidence that he was under 
the influence of intoxicating liquors, and thus incapable 
of making an admissible confession. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant submits that he did not "knowingly and 
intelligently" ·waive his constitutional rights to remain 
silent and to assistance of counsel during questioning as 
defined in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), be-
cause his advanced state of intoxication resulted in an 
impairment of his mental faculties which rendered him 
incapable of a valid waiver. Furthermore, appellant did 
attempt, in a confused and groping manner, to exercise 
his constitutional rights, but the attempt was ignored 
hy interrogating officers. In addition, appellant con-
tends that any statements made by him during the police 
interrogation were inadmissible as evidence since his 
hlood alcohol content of .260 caused him to be so intoxi-
cated as to render his statements involuntary; and be-
cause the involuntary confession was admitted into evi-
dence appellant's conviction must be reversed. 
Based upon the foregoing reasons appellant respect-
fully submits that appellant's conviction in the Third 
Judicial District Court should be reversed. 
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